La délusion réussie : encourager Saddam Hussein à envahir le Koweit.

[JacquesL]

La délusion réussie : encourager Saddam Hussein à envahir le Koweit, juillet 1990.

Remarquez, juillet 1990, ça n'était pas mal non plus, comme délusion : avoir réussi à persuader Saddam Hussein que oui oui, il avait bien le feu vert de l'administration Bush, pour envahir le Koweit...

Moi, en apprenant que le Département d'Etat venait de rappeler son ambassadrice à Baghdad, pour l'obliger à prendre des vacances dans un coin perdu des States, naïvement, je fulminais contre l'inculture historique des Yankees. C'était tellement gros comme bombardement médiatique, toute cette presse iraki se déchaînant ensemble contre le Koweit qui nous vole notre pétrole", cela empestait l'invasion imminente à plein nez... Exactement comme le montage de l'opération "Boîtes de sardines" pour déclencher l'invasion de la Pologne à l'heure prévue.

Bin, j'avais tout faux. Pas sur l'invasion, qui est effectivement arrivée quelques jours plus tard, mais tout faux sur l'hypothèse de bêtise naturelle de l'administration Bush. C'était une sottise totalement artificielle et feinte, très élaborée.

Hyargh Hyargh Hyargh ! A nous les gros contrats d'armement chez ces richissimes émirs et saoudites ! A nous les bases militaires permanentes en Arabie Saoudite ! Hyargh Hyargh Hyargh !

Bien sûr, on ne fait pas d'omelettes sans casser des oeufs. Mais qui se soucie des soldats enterrés vivants dans leurs tranchées, ou des populations civiles écrasées sous les tapis de bombes ? Seul le profit est noble...


Les documents écrits disponibles sur le net concernant les préparatifs de cette invasion, et la délusion US pour y encourager Hussein, se font rares.
http://www.meij.or.jp/text/Gulf%20War/kwtirq900719.htm

Letter of Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to the Secretary General of the United Nations

Your Excellency, Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar, the U.N. Secretary General,
I would like to inform Your Excellency that Kuwait received a memo from the Iraqi government dated July 17th, 1990 with a number of groundless claims and accusations that can be summed up as follows:
First: Kuwait stands behind oil price deterioration by dumping the world market with higher rates of production.
Second: Kuwait has stolen Iraqi oil from the Iraqi oilfield of al-Rumailah.
Third: By so doing, Kuwait has substantially damaged Iraqi economy, an act tantamount to military aggression.
Fourth: All acts by Kuwait are premeditated and agreed upon with foreign entities.
Fifth: Kuwait shows slackness in responding to the good offices made to solve the border question and has deliberately made a gradual calculated advance on the territories of Iraq by establishing installations thereon.
Regarding the first accusation, it contradicts both truth and reality. A follow-up of oil prices would make it quite clear that price deterioration was the result of a world-wide problem involving several parties in and outside the OPEC. As for the claim that Kuwait steals Iraqi oil, we would like to affirm that Kuwait draws oil only from wells within the Kuwait territories south of the Arab League line at a sufficient distance from international borders and according to international measurements.
Concerning the alleged Kuwaiti slackness in responding to the good offices made to solve the border question and the gradual advance on the territories of Iraq by establishing installations thereon, this is all a falsification of reality and a presentation of reversed facts. Kuwait has constantly sought to demarcate the boundary between the two states and resolve the relevant pending problems. But Iraq used to reject any attempt to put an end to the issue, though during the war it attempted to settle finally the question of boundary demarcation with other neighbouring sisterly Arab countries.
Wishing to draw Your Excellency's attention to the seriousness of the claims and accusations included in the Iraqi memo, Kuwait would also like to refer to the threat implied in the statement that Iraq preserves its right to demand the concerned parties to redress the deviation - a deviation that Kuwait affirms to be fictitious.
Kuwait would also like to emphasize that while the world is witnessing a noticeable entente and focuses of tension are diminishing, and though Kuwait has exerted strenuous efforts to put an end to a tragic war that lasted for over eight years during which security and stability were swept away in the region and directly threatened at the international level, the Iraqi memo shows up to brandish tension again in the region, a matter that involves serious dimensions. Regrettably, this memo has been brought forward at an important delicate juncture when lights as well as Arab and world attention are centered on the continuing tragedy of the Palestine people and attempts to find a negotiated solution.
Your Excellency,
Although Iraq intends to keep stepping up propaganda campaigns, Kuwait would like to accentuate its altitudianal commitment in dealing with the neighbouring countries based on good neighbourhood, peaceful coexistence and dialogue to solve the pending problems. Kuwait would also like to stress in this regard its full commitment to the United Nations Charter, its purposes and its objectives.
Your Excellency,
We have submitted this memo to familiarize you with the claims and accusations leveled at Kuwait, a member in your distinguished Organization. We will also keep Your Excellency informed of any new developments in this respect.
Please accept my special appreciation and respect.

Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

This letter was handed by Kuwaiti UN representative Muhammad Abulhasan to De Cuellar, Secretary General of the US on July 19, 1990

The Crime: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, The Kuwait Information Centre in Cairo, Section 2, pp.19 - 20.

http://www.meij.or.jp/text/Gulf%20War/gulfwar.htm

http://www.meij.or.jp/text/Gulf%20War/irqkwt900530.htm

President Saddam Hussein's Speech at a Closed Session of the Extraordinary Baghdad Summit on May 30, 1990

From this conference I personally have taken many lessons just as man continues to learn from life until the last moment of his life. The most important lessons of life are humanitarian.
We hope that our future conference will be like this conference, God willing, and as previous conferences - although in the past there were some problems. But thanks be to God, this conference has taken this course. Still I would like to make a comment which, made within this well-intentioned gathering, would help us. You know brothers, that since 1986 the most important revenue for our Arab economy has been oil, whether in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or Iraq or Libya or Algeria or Kuwait.
All these Arab countries rely basically on oil as their economic lifeline.
From 1986 on, and at a time we were at war, we started to face difficult circumstances similar in their hardships to fighting, especially as these difficulties are linked to the economy and to our main resource, oil. Some kind of disturbance prevailed in the oil market because of non-commitment to OPEC decisions.
It is true that we are not siting here at an OPEC conference but I would like to make a remark which would be to our benefit all. The reason for this disturbance is failure of commitment, on the part of some of our Arab brothers, to OPEC decisions, especially as the oil market was flooded by a glut of oil or at least by offering the consumers flexibility at the expense of price.
The prices plummeted until they sometimes reached 7 dollars per barrel. As regards Iraq, which is not the largest oil producer and does not have the largest OPEC quota, one dollar less on the price of a barrel of oil would bring Iraq's losses to one billion dollar a year as I have been told.
Consequently we will find how much the Arab nation as whole loses in its oil production every year. And from this too we can find a direct answer to the question: Is the Arab nation in a position to lose scores of billions of dollars unjustifiably for an error, be it made by technician or non-technician?
The oil buyers this year, for instance, were at least prepared to pay a price of up to 25 dollars per barrel for two years, as we have heard from Westerners, who are the biggest buyers on the oil market.
Therefore, this huge drain in our economy lies in the blurred vision or in refraining from dealing with a local matter in a Pan-Arab spirit. If a sound attitude towards what is Pan-Arab as well as towards the damage inflicted upon us all I believe we would inflict such big harm on Pan-Arab national economy. With the same frankness and fraternal spirit and in simple terms that would be enough to explain what should be said through analysis, let's say that the war some times is fought by soldiers, damage is done by bombings, killings and coup attempts but some times damage is inflicted on the economy.
Therefore, I will speak this time in the context of the sovereignty in Iraq. I want to say that those who do not mean to launch war against Iraq, that this is a form of war against Iraq.
If there was more to endure we would tolerate but I believe that all our brothers know the situation and are well informed, hoping, God willing, that the situation will always be good. But I say we have reached a point that we can no longer bear pressure. I believe that we will all gain and the Arab nation will also gain from commitment to OPEC decisions, whether in production or in prices and let's rely on God.

Baghdad Observer, July 19, 1990

http://www.meij.or.jp/text/Gulf%20War/iraqiMemo.htm

Iraqi Memorandum to the Arab League on July 15, 1990

His Excellency, Chadli al-Klibi, Secretary General of the League of Arab States.
Brotherly greetings,

At the beginning of this letter we must recall the principles which Iraq believes in and which it has implemented in all honesty and faithfulness in its Arab relations. Iraq believes that the Arabs, wherever they may be, are one nation and that its wealth should be distributed for the benefit of everyone and if anyone should suffer harm or grief then everyone suffers. Iraq looks at the wealth of the nation on the basis of these principles, and it has acted with its wealth in accordance with these principles.
Iraq also believes that in spite of all that the Arab community suffered during the Ottoman period and afterwards, under western imperialism, from all types of division, degradation, persecution and attempts to distort the Arab identity, nevertheless the basis of the unity of the Arab nation remained alive and vibrant; and that the Arab nation, despite its division into states, is one nation and every inch of this nation in this state or another should be considered first of all in the context of nationalist considerations and especially in the context of join Arab national security. It is also necessary to avoid falling into the abyss of narrow and selfish concerns in dealing with the rights and interests of the Arab states.
The higher interest of the Arab nation and the higher strategic calculations of Arab national security should always be present with us. They should always be the top priority in dealing with all these problems among the Arab states. On the basis of these nationalist principles and of sincere and brotherly relations, Iraq dealt with Kuwait in spite of what is known of past and present facts existing between the two states.
What has led us to write this letter is that, with deep sorrow, we are facing now on the part of the government of Kuwait a situation which is beyond the bounds of the nationalist terms of reference which we have mentioned, and contradicts them and threatens their very nature. It also contradicts the fundamental basis of relations between the Arab states. The officials in the government of Kuwait, despite our sincere and brotherly stand in dealing with them on all issues, and despite our concern to continue the brotherly dialogue with them at all times, have attempted in a planned, predetermined and continuous process to take advantage of Iraq and to cause it harm with the intention of weakening it after the end of the ruinous war which lasted eight years. All sincere Arabs, leader, intellectuals and citizens, including the heads of the Gulf states, agreed that in the war Iraq was defending the sovereignty of all the Arab nation, especially the Gulf states and in particular Kuwait. The Government of Kuwait also adopted a policy which attempted to weaken Iraq while it was confronting a vicious imperialist Zionist campaign as a result of its nationalist position in defending Arab rights. This policy was pursued unfortunately by selfish and narrow interests and goals which we cannot any longer but consider as suspicious and dangerous.
We would like to raise two issues here. First, we want to draw attention to the well-known fact that since the days of imperialism and division enforced upon the Arab nation, there has been an unresolved issue of border demarcation between Iraq and Kuwait. The contacts undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s, and up until the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran, with the aim of reaching a solution between the two parties on this subject, were unsuccessful. During the long war years, particularly during the time when the brave Iraqi sons were shedding their precious blood on the front defending the Arab land, including the dignity of Kuwait, the Government of Kuwait exploited the fact that Iraq was preoccupied as well as Iraq's belief in its fundamental nationalist principles and its correct relations with brothers and in nationalist issues, so that it could execute a plan to escalate its gradual and predetermined encroachment on the land of Iraq. It erected military installations, border posts, oil installations and farms on Iraqi territory. We remained silent about all of this and thought it sufficient to make signs and indications hoping that this would be enough in the context of brotherly principles which we thought that everyone believed in. But these actions continued in predetermined and devious ways, confirming the fact that they had been planned in advance.
After the liberation of Fao we took the initiative during the summit conference in Algiers in 1988 to convey to the Kuwaiti side our sincere desire to solve this problem in the context of brotherly relations and higher national interests. But we found ourselves facing a very surprising situation since, although the logic of the situation would have led Kuwaiti officials to be pleased at the generous and fraternal initiative on our part and to have worked to resolve the issue quickly, we encountered deliberate hesitancy and foot dragging on their part with regard to continuing negotiations and contacts. And they raised unnecessary complications while continuing to encroach and erect petroleum and military installations, border posts and farms on Iraqi territory. We put up with this behavior with patience and forbearance. We would have been perfectly willing to be more patient if matters had not moved to a more dangerous level at which we could no longer remain silent and this we will discuss in the second and more critical point. Iraq retains a full record of this matter supported by documents and data which explain excesses undertaken by the Government of Kuwait.
Second, Kuwait started, a few months ago and specifically after Iraq raised its voice loudly in calling for the restoration of the rights of Arabs in Palestine and pointing out the dangers of the American presence in the Gulf, adopting a wrong policy the purpose of which was to harm the Arab nation and particularly Iraq.
Here the Government of the UAE participated with the Government of Kuwait in a planned operation to flood the oil market with excess production which was more than their assigned OPEC quotas, putting forward superficial justifications that did not have any logical, just or fair basis and using justifications which were not shared by any of the brotherly producing countries. This planned policy led to the collapse of oil prices to a very dangerous level. After the collapse in prices which took place several years ago from the high levels which it had achieved of $29, $28 and $24/B the policies of the Governments of Kuwait and the UAE led to the collapse of the level of the minimum and modest price which was agreed upon in OPEC recently - from 18/B to 11-$13/B. A simple mathematical calculation shows the extent of heavy losses inflicted upon the Arab oil producing states:
1. The average oil production of Arab states s 14mn b/d/ The collapse of the prices in the period 1981-1990 led to a loss for he Arab states of approximately $500bn. Iraq's share of that is 89bn. If the Arabs had not lost this huge sum and if we had saved half of it for national development and assistance to poorer Arab states we would have achieved a high rate of national development and would have assisted the poor in our society and the state of the nation would have been stronger, more prosperous and more advanced than it is now. If we take the minimum price agreed upon in OPEC in 1987 ($18/B) them the loss to the Arab states during this period, 1987-1990, due to the collapse of prices is around $25bn.
2. The decline of a single dollar in the oil price leads to a loss for Iraq of $1bn annually. It is known that this year the price has fallen several dollars below that level because of the policies of the Government of Kuwait and the UAE. This means a loss for Iraq of several billion dollars in income this year at a time when it is suffering from a financial crisis because of the cost of its rightful defense of Arab lands, their security and whatever it holds sacred during the fierce eight-year war. These substantial losses arising from the collapse of oil prices have not only affected the oil producing states but they have also caused harm to the other brotherly states which were receiving assistance from the Arab oil producing countries. Aid funds decreased and in some cases even ceased and the condition of the joint Arab institutions deteriorated. This situation was used as an excuse to cut or even end subsidies and support for joint Arab activities.
The Government of Kuwait has added to its premeditated offenses another offense aimed at harming Iraq in particular. Since 1980, and especially during the war, it erected oil installations on the southern part of the Iraqi Rumailah field and produced oil from it. It is clear from this that it was flooding the world oil market in part with oil which it stole from the Iraqi Rumailah field, hence intentionally dealing a double blow to Iraq; once by weakening its economy at a time when it had a dire need of revenues and a second time by stealing its wealth. The value of the oil which the Kuwaiti Government lifted from the Rumailah field in this way, which contravenes brotherly relations, amounts to $2.4bn at the prevailing prices during 1980-1990. We therefore wish to put on record before the Arab League and before all the Arab states, Iraq's right to regain that part of its wealth which was stolen and its right to demand from those concerned a correction of this trasgression and recompense for the damage it suffered.
We explained on numerous previous occasions the dangers of the policy of the Kuwaiti and UAE Governments to our brothers among the oil producing Arab States, including Kuwait and the UAE. We drew attention to this many times, we complained and we warned. At the Baghdad summit, President Saddam Hussein addressed this problem in the presence of Kings, Presidents and Princes, and all other concerned, in a frank and brotherly way (a text of the speech on this subject is attached). We were expecting, especially with the brotherly and positive atmosphere achieved at the Baghdad summit, that the Governments of Kuwait and the UAE would abandon this course of action. But the bitter truth is that all that we undertook in the way of bilateral efforts and contacts with brotherly states to play a positive role in persuading the governments of Kuwait and the UAE to abandon this course, and despite the speech of President Saddam Hussein at the Baghdad summit, these two governments purposely continued this policy. Moreover, some of the officials in these two countries issued insolent statements when we hinted at these facts and complained about them. Therefore, we could not but conclude that what the Governments of Kuwait and the UAE did in this context was a predetermined policy with covert aims. We were also aware that this policy which led to the collapse of the oil price would cause damage in the end to the economies of these two countries themselves.
We, after having clarified these matters to all brothers, and after having requested directly form these two governments to stop these wrong and destructive policies and having explained to them, before, during and after the Baghdad summit, the serious damage inflicted upon us, and after having sent envoys and letters, we condemn what the Governments of Kuwait and the UAE have done as a direct aggression against Iraq as well as a direct aggression against the Arab nation.
As far as the Kuwaiti Government is concerned, its attack on Iraq is a double one. On the one hand Kuwait is attacking Iraq and encroaching on our territory, oilfields and stealing our national wealth. Such action is tantamount to military aggression. On the other had the Government of Kuwait is determined to cause a collapse of the Iraqi economy during this period when it is confronting the vicious imperialist Zionist threat, which is an aggression no less serious than military aggression.
We present these painful facts to our Arab brothers in the hope that they will raise their voices loudly and put an end to this premeditated aggression and advise the two deviationists to return to the proper behavior which takes into consideration joint nationalist interest and the needs of joint nationalist security.
3. In discussion higher nationalist interests and the link between Arab wealth and the future of the Arab nation, we would like to propose the following:
If all the Arab oil producing and non-oil producing countries were to achieve together political solidarity, and agree to raise the oil price above $25/B and then establish a fund for Arab development and assistance along the lines agreed at the 'Amman summit, with the fund being financed at the rate of $1 for every barrel of oil sold by the Arab oil producing countries at a price above 25/B, then a sum of $5bn a year would be accumulated in this fund. At the same time oil revenues of the oil producing countries would also increase substantially because the joint Arab solidarity which would be achieved by this fair price would raise their current incomes and would protect tem form aggressive attempts aimed at weakening Arab strength by undermining the resource of their oil wealth.
We can imagine how a fixed sum like that would strengthen Arab national security and provide development possibilities for all the Arab countries and enable them to confront the stifling economic crises from which most of our countries suffer. Iraq is submitting its proposal for serious study, and the next Arab summit conference in Cairo could be an occasion to discuss this proposal and approve it.
4. Since we are talking about painful facts we deem it necessary to clarify the misunderstanding which some of our brothers might have with regard to (aid) which Kuwait and the UAE accorded to Iraq during the war.
(a) All sincere Arabs in the Arab world had concurred that the war which Iraq had to wage was not only to defend its sovereignty but also to defend the eastern flank of the Arab homeland, and particularly the Gulf area. This was confirmed by the leaders of the Gulf themselves in the strongest of term. Thus the war was considered a nationalist battle in which Iraq had undertaken the role of defending nationalist security and the security of the Gulf in particular.
(b) During the war Iraq received various forms of assistance from its brothers in some of the Gulf countries. The principal part of this assistance was provided at the time of the war in the form of interest-free (loans). Iraq received such assistance in the early stages of the war, but it was stopped after 1982. Iraq, at the time, did not discuss the form of this assistance with its brothers because it was hoping that the war would not last as long as it did and because it was hoping to return to full economic strength after the war. However, the war dragged on and its cost rose to unprecedented levels. The value of the military hardware alone which Iraq purchased and used in the war amounted to $102bn in addition to other enormous military and civilian expenditure in a devastating war which lasted eight years along a front which extended 1,200km.
Despite all the (assistance) which Iraq had received from its brothers - and this was only a small fraction compared to the massive cost incurred by the Iraq economy and the Iraqi people who shed rivers of blood in defense of nationalist sovereignty and nationalist dignity - the Iraqi leadership expressed its deep appreciation to all those brothers who provided assistance. President Saddam Hussein expressed it publicly during the visits made by the heads of the Gulf states to Iraq. But the bitter fact which every Arab should know is that the basic part of the assistance which we mentioned is still recorded as (loans) to Iraq, including that provided by Kuwait and the UAE. We raised the subject with the officials in a brotherly spirit more than a year ago with a view to canceling this (debt) but they avoided the subject. In addition a (debt) was also registered against Iraq for the quantities of crude oil that Kuwait had sold on its behalf from the Khafji area following the closure of the transit pipeline across Syria, despite the fact that this volume was sold outside Kuwait's OPEC quota. In order to understand these facts in full it is important to explain a significant development in the oil market during the period of the war. Iraq was a major producer of crude before the war with an output of around 3.6mn b/d. Bur at the beginning of the war its production stopped completely for several months and then it started exporting small volumes through Turkey and then through Syria until the pipeline stopped in 1982. Iraq's exports of oil from the south were halted from September 1980 until September 1985 when the IPSA-1 pipeline was commissioned. As a result of this massive fall in exports due to the war Iraq lost a huge sum of money estimated at $106bn. From a practical point of view these funds found their way to the treasuries of the other oil producing countries in the area, whose exports increased to compensate for the eight-year shortfall in Iraqi exports. Using basic arithmetic it becomes obvious that the Kuwaiti and UAE claims on Iraq were not all provided by the treasuries of these countries but were the result of increased revenues realized following the fall in Iraqi exports during the years.
We ask: considering that Iraq shouldered the responsibility of Arab national defense and Arab sovereignty and dignity and the wealth of the Gulf states which would have all gone to waste and fallen into the hands of others in the event that Iraq had lost the war, should that assistance be considered a (loan) to us?
During the Second World War the US provided huge sums of money, which it collected from American taxpayers, as assistance to the Soviet Union and its western allies even though they are not part of the same nation. After the Second World War the US extended massive aid under the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. It acted in a comprehensive and strategic way taking into consideration its own security and the security of its allies who participated in the war against a common enemy. So how can these sums still be considered as a claim on Iraq from its brothers in the Arab nation when Iraq sacrificed this debt many times over from its own resources throughout the destructive war and offered rivers of blood from the flower of its youth in defense of the nation(s territory and its honor, dignity and wealth. Doesn't the nationalist logic and security, if we take the American precedent as an example, impel these states to cancel this claim on Iraq and furthermore to organize an Arab plan similar to the Marshall Plan to compensate Iraq for part of what it lost in the war.
Such would be the nationalist logic if there was any conviction in Arabism, in Arab belonging, and in a serious stand towards nationalist security. But instead of pursuing this responsible nationalist path we find two of the Gulf governments, whose wealth Iraq has preserved through the blood of its sons and indeed whose wealth it has increased due to the fall in Iraqi production, now trying to destroy the Iraqi economy and reduce its resources, and we find that the premeditated policy of one of them - the Government of Kuwait - is to commit aggression against the territory of Iraq and to steal the wealth of those who protected the land, honor and wealth of Kuwait.
We submit these painful facts to the conscience of all honorable Arabs, foremost among them the brotherly Kuwaiti people, so that they may realize the pain, harm and injury which we have sustained and from which we are still suffering.
We request the Secretary General to distribute this letter to the Arab states.

Tariq Aziz
Deputy Prime Minister of the Iraqi Republic, Foreign Minister of the Iraqi Republic,
22 Dhu al-Hijja 1410, 15 July 1990

MEES 33:42 (July 23, 1990)

Source : The Middle East Institute of Japan

[JacquesL]

http://www.onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_161.shtml

In December 1990, The Village Voice published a long detailed article on the American entrapment of Iraq in Kuwait. The article described the coordination between the Kuwaiti government with the CIA, James Baker, and the Bush family (Neil Bush had interests in Bahraini oil deals, and oil exploration in the Persian Gulf) to provoke Iraq into attacking Kuwait.

Background: Iraq charged Kuwait with stealing oil through slanted drilling from the Rumailah oil fields situated in Iraq. As a counter-charge, the Kuwaitis threatened that if Iraq attacks Kuwait, Kuwait would, "Call in the Americans."

The American involvement in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute was a masterpiece of double deception. As the United States was telling the Kuwaitis to defy Iraq and not negotiate a solution, it was also assuring the Iraqis that is was neutral on Arab-Arab disputes. Saddam Hussein himself confirmed the American duplicity at the onset of the bombardment of Iraq with a famous exclamation that no one reported in the Western media. Said Hussein: "Laghad ghadara al-ghadiroon," translation: "the treacherous [meaning the United States] betrayed us."

http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_128.shtml

To execute that plan and conquer Iraq in stages beginning with the historical opportunity offered by the imminent collapse of the USSR, three American administrations have transformed Iraq from an advanced, rich, and developing country into a poor and desolate one, and a lab of horror for imperialist engineering. Four periods mark this transformation:

The Period, August 2, 1990 - January 16, 1991:

   * On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait consequent to legitimate grievances with Kuwait (a former Iraqi territory granted independence by colonialist Britain in 1961, which, after a 50-year long claim, Iraq accepted in 1963) and resulting from the U.S. war on Iran by the Iraqi proxy of which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were among the top financiers. That dispute, however, did not justify in any way the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, despite the fact that Washington instigated the Kuwait intransigence to provoke Iraq into to making the fatal move by invading Kuwait. For the record, Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil through cross drilling, and was flooding the oil markets with production out of its OPEC quota to drive the price of oil down, thus impeding Iraq's recovery (an American plan) from its war with Iran.
   * The idea that the United States entrapped Iraq to invade Kuwait rests on solid foundation. On July 19, 1990, U.S. intelligence was aware that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait. The Defense Intelligence Agency's Walter P. Lang saw the satellite images of Iraqi tank formations moving toward and amassing around the Kuwaiti Iraqi borders and knew that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait. [Bob Woodward, The Commanders, Simon & Schuster, 1991, chapter 17, page 205.]
   * The entrapment paradigm was not theory but fact. From July 19 until August 2 of 1990, the United States quietly allowed Iraq to build up its forces in preparation for the invasion and never warned Iraq that it would respond militarily should it invade Kuwait. The paradigm acquires irrefutable certainty consequent to the meeting between President Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie, then U.S. ambassador to Iraq, on July 25, 1990, only seven days before the invasion (read transcript.)
   * In that meeting, Glaspie unequivocally told the Iraqi president, "We [the United States] have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary [of State James] Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America." [Italics added]. Having received that assurance, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
   * On August 6, 1990, not even hours into the invasion, a Security Council dominated by three imperialist states: United States, Britain, and France; a dying Soviet Union in transition to the imperialist camp, and an opportunist China that abstained, imposed total blockade and comprehensive trade sanctions to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Keep in mind that no one moved to impose sanctions of any sort on Israel for its occupation of the whole of Palestine, the Syrian Golan Heights, or its invasion of Lebanon.
   * The following episode is the final proof that the United States was aiming for war against Iraq at any cost. On August 3, 1990, President Saddam Hussein told King Hussein of Jordan that he would attend a mini-summit in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) with King Fahd and the Emir of Kuwait to resolve the issue and that Iraq will withdraw its forces on August 5. The U.S. forced Saudi Arabia to cancel the meeting, ordered the Arab League through their marionette, Egypt, to condemn Iraq against the statute of the league requiring unanimity on the vote (seven states voted against). Earlier, on August 3, Iraq had threatened that if the League were to condemn Iraq, Iraq would annex Kuwait. The U.S. knew this private information from Mubarak of Egypt. Thus the sabotage of the summit was a very precise move, aimed at forcing a resolute Iraqi president to annex Kuwait, thus creating the objective conditions to build up the successive moves for war against Iraq [Pierre Salinger, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War, Penguin Books, 1991, Chapter 6, page 94]
   * Consequently, the unprecedented and prompt impositions of trade sanctions, coupled with the deliberation of Arab servants of the United States, were, per se, sufficient to stiffen Iraqi positions. With sanctions imposed immediately, with British and American fleets heading for the region, and with all threats to decapitate Iraq as a state (Air Force Gen. Michel Dugan, threatened to return Iraq to the "stone age") Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein became adamant about not relinquishing Kuwait.
   * Determined to keep its thrust for war, the United States refused all proposals advanced by Iraq for political settlement. One such proposal posited that Iraq would withdraw its forces from Kuwait, if Israel withdraws from the Arab lands it occupied in 1967. The U.S. and its Arab lackeys refused this important proposal.
   * To increase the pressure on Iraq for a military confrontation, the United States took advantage from Iraq sealing its borders in expectation of an American attack and insinuated Iraq took American hostages. But when Iraq allowed all foreigners to leave Iraq, the U.S. claimed it was a propaganda gesture.
   * During the political stalemate and up until Operation Desert Slaughter [Desert Storm], Iraqis could not import medicine and food (although the UN excluded these two items from its embargo, medicine and food could not reach Iraq via the ban on travel), machinery and spare parts, school supplies, etc. In addition, the U.S. seized or froze all of Iraq's financial assets abroad. On top of all that, the U.S. imposed a total air and land travel ban, from and into Iraq.
   * It is vital to note that that in its entire history, the UN never adopted such harsh measures in the past against any nation deemed aggressor. For instance, when Iraq invaded Iran, the UN and the U.S. just issued calls to stop the fighting, but Henry Kissinger formulated U.S. thought clearly. He said, "It is in our interest that they bleed each other to death." Also, when Israel invaded Lebanon; the USSR, Czechoslovakia and later Afghanistan; China, Tibet (despite the fact that Tibet, historically, is Chinese territory); or when the United States invaded Panama, and now Iraq, the UN imperialist system did not move a finger.
   * There are no accurate statistics on how many elderly and sick people have perished in Iraq because of lack of medicine or medical care during the political standoff before the "Gulf War." But the one thing certain about that period is, as a developing country, Iraq ceased to develop . . .

[JacquesL]

http://blamebush.typepad.com/blamebush/2007/01/chuck_heston_gu.html

On the other hand, tribunal officials had indicated that one of the major atrocities that would be dealt with was Saddam's slaughter of tens, possibly hundreds of thousands of Shiites in Southern Iraq following their uprising in 1991. They were answering the repeated public calls for rebellion by President George H.W. Bush. They didn't realize Bush and his pragmatic Secretary of State James Baker didn't really mean it.

When it looked as it the insurgents might actually succeed, the American president turned his back. The White House and its allies wanted Saddam replaced not by a popular revolt which they couldn't control, but by a military leader, more amenable to U.S. interests. So, as the United States permitted Saddam's attack helicopters to decimate the rebels, American troops just a few kilometers away from the slaughter were ordered to destroy huge stocks of captured weapons rather than let them fall into rebel hands. How enlightening it would have been to hear Saddam recount his feeling of relief when he realized that President Bush père was actually going to help him stay in power.

Forget the trial. What if, instead of the Special Tribunal — or along with it — Iraq had established a Truth Commission such as South Africa did following the fall of apartheid? Saddam might have explained [size=13pt]to what degree feckless U.S. diplomacy was responsible for his concluding there would be no reaction from Washington if he were to invade Kuwait in 1990.[/size]

[JacquesL]

Un récit de témoin oculaire, montrant que peu de gens doutaient de l'imminnence de l'invasion, et combien frappante était l'inactivité diplomatique internationale : http://users.lighthouse.net/danvaught/eyewitness01.html

Our observations in the region indicated in early 1990 that storm clouds were gathering, but most in DoD and State Department had little interest in the ensuing inter-Arab dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. Even the CENTCOM J-2 threat update was focused on Iran as the major regional threat. The embassy was focused on monitoring the Russians in country and the extent of their military programs with Kuwait. There was interest in the internal Kuwaiti problems regarding a popular move to bring back the National Assembly. The Amir had dissolved the assembly a few years earlier when too much dissension was occurring. However, on the surface everything appeared to be peaceful.
 Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwaiti Armed Forces were generally equipped and trained by the British. This was due to the long historical ties between Kuwait and the British. By the late eighties, the Kuwaitis had begun a modest program to upgrade their three Land Force brigades. The United States and western European nations had lost out when the Kuwaiti's decided, in early 1988, to buy Russian BMP IIs and Yugoslavian M-84s, (T-72 variant). This was attributed to the inexpensive deals both countries were offering in comparison to buying the more expensive and sophisticated U.S. and Western European armaments. Kuwait also had a tendency to engage several countries for arms deals, their way of spreading the wealth around. Their Army consisted of equipment from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Yugoslavia, and many others. It was a strategy to maintain friendship ties with many and show no favoritism towards one particular country. The result for their military was an absolute nightmare for interoperability. The Kuwait Government also required that U.S. military personnel wear no uniforms or openly acknowledge their presence, an arrangement that would pay dividends for us during the Iraqi invasion.
 In the months proceeding the invasion, USLOK team members began monitoring the situation between Kuwait and Iraq. While working out in the field with the various units and at the Land Forces Headquarters, we began getting indicators as early as March 1990 that the relationship Kuwait shared with its neighbor to the north (Iraq) was taking a turn for the worst. However, in most diplomatic and military circles, it was felt that it was nothing more than bellicose chest pounding and posturing by Saddam Hussein. Many in the diplomatic circles felt the problem would eventually go away by the Kuwaiti's throwing millions of dollars at the disgruntled Iraqi leader, who had bankrupted his country after eight years of war with the Iranians and had nothing to show for it. At our Headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 remained focused on Iran, and felt Iraq was too disorganized after the war with Iran to pose any near term threat in the region. Iranian radical fundamentalism and support of terrorism was believed to be far more threatening to the region. The Iran/Iraq war had cost Saddam Hussein dearly and he felt he had done the Gulf oil sheikdoms a favor by fighting the Iranians and stopping the spread radical Shia Islam. In hindsight, it's easy to see that the war did nothing to improve Iraqi operational military prowess. His country was broke, his oil production was too low to get the economy back on its feet, and the Iraqi people had suffered tremendously.
 In early 1990, the Arab League held a summit in Baghdad and Saddam initiated his political attacks against Kuwait and to a lesser degree on other Gulf nations. Kuwait specifically was accused of waging economic war against Iraq and slant drilling to steal oil from Iraqi fields along the border. When the summit ended most Arab nations felt Kuwait and Iraq would reach some type of monetary settlement. However, the problems continued to fester in the coming months as Iraq stepped up its propaganda war and launched significant personal attacks on the Kuwaitis and the ruling family.
 By early June 1990, several senior Kuwaiti officers told us of the outlandish propaganda broadcast from Baghdad. They were extremely concerned and agitated because the language used in the broadcast was Arabic that one only uses when compromise is unattainable and the only recourse is to fight. They openly acknowledged that they were unprepared for any confrontation and the Kuwait government seemed to be unwilling to take any preparatory actions. Many also informed us that the Iraqi Army was conducting an unusually high number of exercises in southern Iraq. In mid-July 1990, the Kuwaiti military went on their first and only alert status, but after one week and evidence of Iraqi troop movements became clearer, the Kuwaiti's quickly called off their haphazard alert for fear of provoking Saddam Hussein. On a regional level President Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and King Hussein (Jordan) attempted to persuade Iraq to at least meet with the Kuwaitis to discuss their problems. Both heads of state received assurances from Iraq that a peaceful solution could be found. At our embassy, there was interest in monitoring the situation, but with President Mubarak, and King Hussein's assurances most felt the problem would be settled, and Kuwait would reach a monetary settlement with Iraq. The Kuwaitis genuinely felt they had a chance to reach an agreement, but were bound and determine not to give up territory or completely forgive the war debt Saddam owed them. That essentially sealed their fate and made the meeting in Jeddah an Iraqi ploy to demonstrate they had left no stone unturned in trying to settle a dispute in a Arab brotherly fashion. Also, now known, was the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie had met with Saddam in mid-July and essentially conveyed to him that the U.S. had no interest in his dispute with Kuwait and no defense treaties. Department of State (DOS) also conveyed this same message just weeks before the invasion in congressional testimony.
 Once it was realized that a compromise would not be reached, and the Iraqi leader's demands were unyielding, (this timeframe was the week prior to the invasion), Kuwaiti's began talking of the Iraqi's seizing the contested northern (Rumaylla) oilfields and the two tiny islands (Warba/Bubiyan) near the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, entrance way into the Arabian Gulf. There had been a historical precedent for this during a 1961 Kuwait/Iraq border dispute that was quickly resolved when the British committed a small force to stymie the Iraqi incursion. Now the situation was different, Iraq at last had a sizable force, and Kuwait no longer had any western defense pacts or treaties. In fact, the one defense treaty that Kuwait participated in was the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). However, the GCC would take virtually no action to dissuade Saddam from his intentions. The purpose of the GCC was to protect one another from precisely happening before their very eyes. The United Arab Emirates acted on their own and requested United States assistance's in late July 1990 when Saddam began including the U.A.E. in his threats. Nevertheless, the GCC proved to be virtually paralyzed, unwilling, and unable to deal with Saddam. During the weeks proceeding the invasion, the GCC did not even meet in session. Even the Peninsular Shield force, a GCC reaction force of roughly brigade size, was not utilized or alerted during the entire crisis. The value of the GCC as a defense pact proved to be worthless.
 We watched knowing that something would happen and hoping Kuwait would pay off Saddam Hussein. A week before the invasion a former Kuwaiti officer and friend who worked at a Kuwaiti bank informed me that the Kuwait government had to put a stop on all overseas electronic fund transfers. The problem was as the crisis unfolded; many Kuwaitis began transferring all their accounts to banks in the U.S. and Great Britain out of fear of an Iraq invasion. In addition, by the last week of July, all international and regional domestic flights were sold out. The panic within the populace had begun, but the government would not acknowledge there was a growing problem. At our last official embassy country team meeting, 29 July 1990, we were all cautioned to stay close to home and insure our Motorola radios were working properly. Our state department diplomats also assured us that they would see to our hasty evacuation well before any hostilities started. Our Chief had suggested that the women and children go on to Saudi Arabia as a precaution, but the Ambassador ruled that out, stating he felt the Kuwaiti's would resolve the problem at the Jeddah meeting scheduled for 1 August 1990. Before the meeting adjourned the Ambassador assured everyone that this was typical Arab bluff and talk, he really doubted the Iraqis would invade Kuwait.

[JacquesL]

http://www.polyconomics.com/searchbase/02-19-98.html

In the years since, I've concluded that Saddam had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia. I later learned, as did you, of the "green light" that April Glaspie gave Saddam in their July 24 meeting. I also learned that Ms. Glaspie was subsequently "surprised" when the Iraqi army did not stop at the oil fields, but went on to Kuwait City. Of course, if you consider that Kuwait is only 13% the size of your home state of North Carolina, and Iraq is 10,000 square miles larger than California, you will see that it did not take much for tanks to overshoot Kuwait City and appear to be menacing Saudi Arabia. In his invasion of Iran, remember that Saddam did stop when he got what he wanted, and was later criticized for not pushing as far as he could so that he would have a better bargaining position.

   On 24 July 1990 two Iraqi armoured divisions moved from their bases to take up positions on the Kuwaiti border. Later the same day the US State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, asked whether the US had any military plans to defend Kuwait, replied: 'We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.' The next day Saddam Hussein summoned US Ambassador April Glaspie to his office in what was to be the last official contact between Baghdad and the United States before the invasion of Kuwait. Even at this late stage, with an obviously deteriorating situation in the Gulf, Glaspie still made efforts to placate Saddam Hussein. She emphasized that President Bush had rejected the idea of trade sanctions against Iraq, to which Saddam replied: 'There is nothing left for us to buy from America except wheat. Every time we want to buy something, they say it is forbidden. I am afraid that one day you will say, "you are going to make gunpowder out of wheat".' Glaspie was quick to reassure the Iraqi leader : 'I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.' And she emphasized that a formal apology had been offered to Iraq for a critical article that had been published by the American Information Agency: 'I saw the Diane Sawyer programme on ABC...what happened in that programme was cheap and unjust...this is a real picture of what happens in the American media -- even to American politicians themselves. These are the methods that the Western media employ. I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats that stand up to the media....' Later Glaspie added that "President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq...'; and then the ambassador produced the much-quoted comment that was perhaps the biggest 'green light' of all: "I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait. [Author's italics]."

On July 31, two days before the invasion, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified before Chairman Lee Hamilton of House Foreign Affairs. Asked repeatedly if we would come to the defense of Kuwait if it were attacked, he insisted there was no obligation on our part to do so.

[JacquesL]

http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/4266.asp :

International oil companies set up Saddam in 1990 – obtuse Saddam fell into the trap!
Balaji Reddy
Aug. 19, 2005

According to some American talk radio, it was a planned conspiracy by the international oil companies. The Kuwaitis were told to steal oil from a controversial oil field that Iraq claimed as theirs. Saddam was given the information and the natural reaction was to protest. Saddam got a passive signal that it was ok to attack Kuwait. In the mean time well in advance the Kuwaiti king and all the important people from Kuwait were escorted out of Kuwait well in advance to Saudi Arabia. They were well escorted in Saudi Arabia so that they can be put back into power after Iraq id ousted from Kuwait.

Soon after Iraq invasion these oil companies changed the stories and made America attack Iraq to grab more oil resources. Eventually thirteen years later they got what they wanted – the oil fields of Iraq. The events after that did not go very well. The oil companies never understood what kind of insurgency they will face.

Saddam, the butcher of Baghdad failed to understand the conspiracy and stupidly fell into the trap!

[JacquesL]

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2326/stories/20070112005113000.htm :

After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the government in Baghdad found itself deep in debt and isolated in the region. Kuwait's refusal to honour its commitments made at the beginning of the war angered Saddam no end. Iraq's claim over Kuwait has been a long-standing one. As the dispute between the two countries raged, Saddam once again made a major miscalculation. He thought that he had received the tacit approval of the U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad for an invasion of Kuwait.

The U.S. Ambassador, April Glaspie, had told Saddam that her country would not interfere in a dispute between the two countries.

The invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, was an unmitigated military disaster,

[JacquesL]

http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/45190/

"Pragmatist" is the word most often used to describe Iraq Study Group co-chair James A. Baker III. It is equally appropriate for Lawrence Eagleburger. The term applies particularly well to each man's efforts to expand U.S. economic engagement with Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Not only did their efforts enrich Hussein and U.S. corporations, particularly oil companies, it also served the interests of their own private firms.

On April 21,1990, a U.S. delegation was sent to Iraq to placate Saddam Hussein as his anti-American rhetoric and threats of a Kuwaiti invasion intensified. James A. Baker III, then President George H.W. Bush's secretary of state, personally sent a cable to the U.S embassy in Baghdad instructing the U.S. ambassador to meet with Hussein and to make clear that, "as concerned as we are about Iraq's chemical, nuclear, and missile programs, we are not in any sense preparing the way for preemptive military unilateral effort to eliminate these programs."*

Instead, Baker's interest was focused on trade, which he described as the "central factor in the U.S-Iraq relationship." From 1982, when Reagan removed Iraq from the list of countries supporting terrorism, until August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Baker and Eagleburger worked with others in the Reagan and Bush administrations to aggressively and successfully expand this trade.

The efficacy of such a move may best be described in a memo written in 1988 by the Bush transition team arguing that the United States would have "to decide whether to treat Iraq as a distasteful dictatorship to be shunned where possible, or to recognize Iraq's present and potential power in the region and accord it relatively high priority. We strongly urge the latter view." Two reasons offered were Iraq's "vast oil reserves," which promised "a lucrative market for U.S. goods," and the fact that U.S. oil imports from Iraq were skyrocketing. Bush and Baker took the transition team's advice and ran with it.

[JacquesL]

Et rappelez-nous combien on nous avait martelé que l'Iraq martelait qu'il allait annexer aussi le Hedjaz et le Nedjd, autrement dit l'essentiel de l'Arabie Saoudite.

Les photos satellites prouvaient qu'il n'en était rien, elles ont été récemment déclassifiées :
http://foi.missouri.edu/polinfoprop/inwarsomefacts.html

Examining the evidence

Shortly before US strikes began in the Gulf War, for example, the St. Petersburg Times asked two experts to examine the satellite images of the Kuwait and Saudi Arabia border area taken in mid-September 1990, a month and a half after the Iraqi invasion. The experts, including a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst who specialized in desert warfare, pointed out the US build-up – jet fighters standing wing-tip to wing-tip at Saudi bases – but were surprised to see almost no sign of the Iraqis.

"That [Iraqi buildup] was the whole justification for Bush sending troops in there, and it just didn't exist," Ms. Heller says. Three times Heller contacted the office of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (now vice president) for evidence refuting the Times photos or analysis – offering to hold the story if proven wrong.

The official response: "Trust us." To this day, the Pentagon's photographs of the Iraqi troop buildup remain classified.

After the war, the House Armed Services Committee issued a report on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It did not specifically look at the early stages of the Iraqi troop buildup in the fall, when the Bush administration was making its case to send American forces. But it did conclude that at the start of the ground war in February, the US faced only 183,000 Iraqi troops, less than half the Pentagon estimate. In 1996, Gen. Colin Powell, who is secretary of state today, told the PBS documentary program Frontline: "The Iraqis may not have been as strong as we thought they were...but that doesn't make a whole lot of difference to me. We put in place a force that would deal with it – whether they were 300,000, or 500,000."